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The idea that certain meanings will get lost in translation 
from one culture to another has been nearly reduced to cliché. 
But that doesn’t make the experience of being stuck in the gap 
between cultures any less real or frustrating. And it doesn’t mean 
that the gap isn’t worth exploring. This certainly applies to 
studying classical Islamic law from an American perspective. 
When doing so, it is important not only to recognize that certain 
meanings will be difficult if not impossible to translate correctly 
but also to notice what exactly these gaps are, for even the 
smallest gaps can have great implications if they serve as the 
foundation of something as important as a society’s law. In his 
book The Spirit of Islamic Law, Bernard G. Weiss takes pains to 
highlight the key values in Islamic society that form the 
foundation of law. If we are to make a dedicated effort to 
understand Islamic law, we must not only pay attention to these 
key concepts but also note the major and minor ways that they 
differ from our own frames of reference- which in this case will 
be a modern American frame of reference. This certainly applies 
to key ideas such as reason, belief and knowledge. 
To better understand reason’s place in Islam, it is 
important to take note of what Muslim jurists consider to be the 
conceptual starting point of law: the existence of God. Here the 
line between jurisprudence and theology (kalam) blurs. “Indeed, 
many of the Muslim jurists regarded their jurisprudence as 
logically grounded in kalam; from kalam it drew its most 
fundamental postulates, among which the existence of God was 
primary. These postulates were the starting point of 
jurisprudence; without them jurisprudence could not proceed 
(Weiss 25). This statement says something interesting about the 
purpose of reason in law. The jurist sets off to prove something, 
with the assumption that it must be true in order to do the 
business that is law.  In fact, since many classic jurists were ruling 
after Islamic law had been put into practice (even if only shortly 
after), proofs were being created to justify a system already in 
place. Reason then serves as a conceptual starting point, not 
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necessarily a tool to create a law system from scratch. In other 
words, a jurist would not necessarily be stalled in making rulings 
without the exact philosophical basis for law. The Muslim jurist 
by definition already believed in the God of the Qur’an as 
dictated to Muhammad. If the jurist and the people who went to 
him for rulings already believed in the God of the Qur’an, then 
there must be another purpose for going through the exercise of 
creating proofs for the existence of God. I would propose two 
purposes for the emphasis on reason. The first is that the process 
of reasoning is intricately related to the nature of belief in Islam, 
whose tradition goes all the way back to the Qur’an. The second 
related purpose is that the highly rational nature of Islamic law 
demands a strong rational foundation. 
I will deal first with the nature of belief in Islam and how 
crucial reason is to belief. Right from the beginning, if we’re 
going to talk about Islamic “belief,” Weiss points out the linguistic 
gap that will hinder an English-speaker’s understanding- a gap 
that will help us to understand better the importance of reason.  
The word “belief” in English does not necessarily imply 
that one has arrived at a conclusion using strictly rational means. 
In fact, it is often used to mean exactly the opposite- belief is the 
category of ideas held to be true that have not been arrived at 
using reason or empirical evidence. This definition of belief is 
used in counterpoint with the notion of knowledge, which is the 
category of ideas held to be true that have been arrived at using 
reason and empirical evidence. In this sense, belief and 
knowledge are inextricably tied to one another since they 
represent opposite ends of the spectrum in the realm of ideas 
held to be true. This is not to say that belief and knowledge are 
black and white categories or that they’re even always used in this 
exact sense, but this division in English is common enough to 
create confusion when discussing Islamic “belief,” since that 
rather than “knowledge” is the word often used in English when 
discussing ideas that we assign to the realm of religion and God. 
This creates problems, however, because as Weiss points 
out, “In Islam, belief is holding something to be true and one 
holds a thing to be true (tasdiq) only because one knows it to be 
true. Belief and knowledge are thus closely interrelated if not 
identical” (27). Belief has not been divorced from reason in 
Islam. It is not viewed as a threat. In fact the opposite is true. 
2
Macalester Islam Journal, Vol. 1 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/islam/vol1/iss1/9
 
Macalester Islam Journal                Spring 2006                  page   50
______________________________________________________
 
Reason does not just support belief but is crucial part of belief. 
This idea presents difficulties for students steeped in western 
thought as Weiss notes, “In classical Islam there is no place for 
the modern, largely existentialist idea of the ‘leap of faith.’ 
Nothing as foundational to Islam as God’s existence is to be taken 
‘on faith’ in the meaning ordinarily given to that phrase in 
contemporary English” (26-27). Reason is not considered 
something that can just be used to augment one’s previously held 
belief in God. It is not a tool that can be used to prove the 
existence of God and tucked away until one comes across, say, an 
atheist or polytheist. Reason is not extraneous but woven into the 
very fabric of belief, which presupposes that one already has 
support and evidence for this idea held to be true. The emphasis 
on reason then is an outgrowth of the Islamic notion of belief. It 
is thought of as a necessary part of belief, rather than a tool one 
uses in response to the challenges of skeptics. 
The importance of pursuing reason as an important 
feature of Islamic thought is further confirmed by historical 
phenomena. Proofs of God’s existence were important not only 
for jurists who already believed in God and were part of a system 
that presupposed his existence but also for theologians who 
carefully crafted proofs in a world where atheists were rare (27). 
However, this leads us to wonder where this tradition of rational 
belief comes from. 
We turn no longer to history or linguistics, but the 
central text of Islam: “…theological reflection was inspired by the 
Qur’an itself, which alludes repeatedly to the ‘signs of God’ in the 
nature world and calls upon humans to ponder them” (Weiss 26). 
That the central text of Islam encourages reflection on the 
connection between the natural world and its causes is 
noteworthy, because up until this point we have been caught up 
in a chicken-and-egg circle of logic, wondering which came 
first- the belief or the proof? Many jurists set about to prove the 
existence of God, because there can be no law without God. 
Before the proof was completed, the jurists had to believe in his 
existence enough to care enough to set about proving it, yet the 
notion of belief in Islam is that one believes only when one 
rationally knows something. But how can one believe before one 
begins to use logic to prove that belief? Qur’anic tradition 
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provides a way out of this vicious circle of logic that has no true 
starting point- chronologically or logically. 
In the Qur’an, the proof of God’s existence is part of the 
text. Listeners and later readers of the text are encouraged to use 
their natural faculties to observe the world around them and 
conclude that God does indeed exist. This proof embedded 
within the text does two things. First, it provides the foundation 
or starting point for the belief/knowledge required for Islam. 
One could theoretically come to the text without belief or 
knowledge of God, and find the foundation for faith within the 
text. This proof then is a means to knowledge of/belief in God. 
Second, the proof in the text sets an important precedent in 
Islamic thought in its emphasis on determining the meaning of 
signs using reason. This is less important for the purposes of logic 
than for understanding from a cultural perspective why there is 
such an emphasis on reason in a belief system.  The answer here 
is that the process of reasoning is an integral component of 
Islamic belief from the beginning- the seminal texts. Tracing the 
importance of reason in Islam to the Qur’an is enough for our 
own purpose, which is to distinguish why this happened in Islam 
while it did not necessarily develop this way in other traditions, 
such as western thought where reason and belief came to be seen 
as opponents in certain arenas. It is important to note that, as 
with any idea of great social importance, we could try and trace 
the roots of the tradition of reasoning and looking for proof to 
the time before the Qur’an, the prophet and Islam as it came to 
be known, but we would trap ourselves unnecessarily in an 
infinite regression back to the beginning of man. It is enough to 
trace the origins of an Islamic tradition back to the Qur’an, since 
it is such a central text. We can say now with confidence that we 
have found both conceptual and historical starting points for the 
importance in using reason to prove the existence of God in 
Islamic tradition. 
We return to law and the Muslim jurist who found it 
absolutely necessary to prove God’s existence in order to have 
law. We determined already that many of the jurists who engaged 
in this type of theological reflection were doing so in a time and 
society where belief in/knowledge of God was already a given. 
Now we turn to the nature of law itself and why this demanded 
such as strong rational foundation, even among schools of law 
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which believed that God’s instructions, rather than human 
rationality should be used to create law. 
To do this, we can first take a look at what Islamic law 
would be without a rationally grounded belief in God. Let’s 
pretend that we’re existentialists who have decided to make a 
jump and accept that there is one God, Muhammed is his 
prophet and the Qur’an is the word of God as revealed to the 
prophet. “Given that God exists, it follows by an inexorable 
monotheistic logic that he is the one to whom mankind must first 
turn as a source of law, for he alone is the ultimate sovereign, the 
possessor of all original rights” (24). Even if jurists could follow 
this line of logic starting with a presupposed belief in the 
existence of God all the way to belief that his laws could be found 
in the words of the Qur’an, there was not yet a usable form of law. 
The words of the Qur’an and also the Sunna needed 
interpretation- a basis that is more difficult to determine without 
a rational basis for belief.  
The bulk of Weiss’ book explores this process and the 
different ways that schools of thought accomplished this, from 
the use of analogy to the problem of uncertainty in interpretation 
and the philosophical bases of the approaches to these problems. 
For instance, when a jurist had to make a decision about a case 
regarding a situation not outlined exactly in the Qur’an or 
Sunna, there were several different approaches that he could 
take. He could draw principles from several situations and apply 
the principle to the new situation or he could use one specific 
case and interpret what the general rule behind the case was and 
then apply the general rule to the new situation. These different 
strategies could not just be used haphazardly; even if different 
schools took different approaches, they had to be rationalized 
and shown to be a part of the greater intention of God. Mere 
human reason was not enough to build a system of law. Nor was 
mere human interpretation. “Between human reason and the law 
of God there stretched an essentially unbridgeable gap” (37). As 
a part of their occupation, jurists attempted to bridge this gap as 
best they could, but they found that it was not enough to 
interpret the text that they had been given, for their were many 
possible routes. To do the best job possible, they found it 
necessary to rationalize the entire system and consider the 
context of the laws that have been given. Again, the Qur’an serves 
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as a starting point for a tradition of reasoning.  “The law always, 
for Muslim jurists without exception, has its primary original 
setting in the encounter between a divine addressor and a human 
addressee…the terms of the covenant discussed in the Qur’anic 
commentaries” (33). The Qur’an encourages believers to go back 
to the beginning and consider how law emanates from divinity. 
For a Muslim jurist, to go back to the beginning is to reason that 
God exists, that he is the creator of all, including man, who as a 
part of creation is subject to the creator’s will or as Weiss states it, 
“Given that God exists, it follows by an inexorable monotheistic 
logic that he is the one to whom mankind must first turn as a 
source of law, for he alone is the ultimate sovereign, the possessor 
of all original rights” (24). Here we find ourselves reaching the 
greater basis of law. Only when God and the basis of law had been 
rationally conceived, was it possible for a Muslim jurist to move 
forward in the work of determining what divine law is based on 
divine text. The rational basis for the text provides the necessary 
context to discover the intention of divine law- without having to 
make any unnecessary existential leaps of judgment. 
We started out with an acknowledgement that different 
words and concepts in cultures do not necessarily always translate 
perfectly or adequately to others. This truism provides a perfect 
starting point to attempt an understanding of classical Islamic 
law. In trying to understand the different concepts of reason, 
belief and knowledge in that realm, we have come to understand 
something that would vex many Americans given their own 
definitions of these concepts: that the law of Islam held to be 
divine by its practitioners puts an incredible amount of stress on 
its rational basis. In trying to understand a seeming paradox, we 
have discovered how closely interwoven rationality is with Islamic 
belief and how this affects the practical application of divine will 
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